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ARTICLE
DOES QUALIFIED IMMUNITY MATTER?
ALEXANDER A. REINERT1
ABSTRACT
In litigation brought pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), most commentators
agree that qualified immunity plays a substantial role in limiting plaintiffs’
ability to recover compensation. Many find this tradeoff acceptable, in part
because of concerns of fairness to government official defendants and in
part because courts may still play a central role in announcing the law with-
out worrying over the retroactive effect their decision will have on the per-
sonal funds of the defendant official.
This paper considers the different role that qualified immunity may
play in Bivens and other civil rights litigation. Empirical support for the
proposition that qualified immunity plays a significant role in filed cases is
limited and more recent data call it into question. Working from the as-
sumption that qualified immunity plays less of a role in filed cases than has
been assumed, this paper considers other ways in which the defense of qual-
ified immunity may affect the course of constitutional litigation. In particu-
lar, this paper focuses on the role that qualified immunity may play in case
screening and reports on the results of a qualitative survey of civil rights
practitioners.
The results suggest that lawyers often take qualified immunity into
account at the case-screening stage and indeed may in some cases avoid
litigation in which qualified immunity is even a potential issue. This obser-
vation has ramifications for the theory that qualified immunity enhances the
law-announcing function of federal courts.
INTRODUCTION
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcot-
ics,2 the Supreme Court held for the first time that federal employees may
1. Associate Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University.
E-mail: areinert@yu.edu.
2. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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be sued for damages in their personal capacity3 for violations of the Consti-
tution.4 Despite the potentially broad nature of the remedy at its inception,
plaintiffs seeking to use Bivens to establish individual liability of govern-
mental officials for constitutional wrongdoing face numerous obstacles.
They often proceed without representation, whereas governmental officials
are represented either by experienced government lawyers or private coun-
sel.5 Relatedly, the resource inequality between individual plaintiffs and
governmental-official defendants is stark.6 Establishing that the Constitu-
tion has been violated can itself be a difficult task, with substantive legal
principles tilting the balance in favor of governmental officials.7 Some have
argued that this is even more difficult when the defendant is a federal offi-
cial because of judicial biases in favor of federal decision makers.8 Finally,
3. Personal capacity claims are brought against government officials individually, almost
always for damages. In theory, defendants who are found liable in their personal capacity are
responsible for paying damages out of their own pockets, although the federal government usually
indemnifies employees for the damages awarded in constitutional tort actions. See, e.g., Cornelia
T.L. Pillard, Taking Fiction Seriously: The Strange Results of Public Officials’ Individual Liability
Under Bivens, 88 GEO. L.J. 65, 76–78 (1999) (identifying methods individuals use to cover costs
and justifications for employer shouldering the cost). Official capacity claims, by contrast, are
brought nominally against government officials, but typically seek injunctive relief against a gov-
ernment entity that would otherwise be immune from suit in federal court. See, e.g., Pennhurst
State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100–01 (1984) (summarizing Eleventh Amend-
ment principle that unconsenting states and their agencies may not be sued in federal court, re-
gardless of the relief sought). For a detailed discussion of the practical distinction between
personal and official capacity claims, see Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991).
4. 403 U.S. at 395–97.
5. See Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its Conse-
quences for the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809, 837–39 (2010) (reporting that
of 241 Bivens cases filed over three years in five district courts, 190 were pro se); David Zaring,
Personal Liability as Administrative Law, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 313 (2009) (reporting that of
188 Bivens appeals decided over the course of two years, 101 of the plaintiffs were pro se). Bivens
defendants, by contrast, are entitled to representation by attorneys from the Department of Justice
or, where appropriate, private counsel. See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 50.15(a), (b)(2) (2011) (providing
right to representation for federal employees and officials sued for actions within the scope of
employment when representation is in the interest of the United States); 28 C.F.R. § 50.16 (2011)
(detailing circumstances in which employee has right to representation by private counsel).
6. See Issachar Rosen-Zvi & Talia Fisher, Overcoming Procedural Boundaries, 94 VA. L.
REV. 79, 101–02 (2008) (“The government possesses numerous qualities that enable it to fare
considerably better than any other party to litigation: it has vast resources and ample experience,
and it is also the entity that sets the basic rules of the game.”).
7. Prisoners, for instance, must show that officials acted with deliberate indifference in
some instances, see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976), or that they behaved “maliciously
and sadistically” in others, see Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). Plaintiffs must show
that defendants behaved unreasonably to establish a violation of the Fourth Amendment, but law
enforcement officials are shown a high degree of deference in such cases. See Saucier v. Katz, 533
U.S. 194, 206 (2001) (“Officers can have reasonable, but mistaken, beliefs as to the facts estab-
lishing the existence of probable cause or exigent circumstances, for example, and in those situa-
tions courts will not hold that they have violated the Constitution.”), abrogated on other grounds
by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
8. See generally Richard A. Primus, Bolling Alone, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 975 (2004) (argu-
ing that federal courts did not find federal race discrimination unconstitutional as a result of shared
views about what race discrimination was unlawful).
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numerous principles have been adopted that limit the scope of Bivens liabil-
ity, with the Supreme Court often expressing hostility to the remedy itself.9
Most academics and jurists agree, however, that the qualified immu-
nity defense is one of the most substantial barriers to the success of lawsuits
seeking damages against federal officials for constitutional violations (a.k.a.
Bivens litigation).10 Put simply, qualified immunity permits officials who
have violated the law to escape liability when they have behaved reasona-
bly. Official misconduct can be reasonable for one of two reasons: (1) be-
cause the law governing the official’s conduct was not “clearly
established;” or (2) because the official behaved in an objectively reasona-
ble manner in light of clearly established law.11 If an official can establish
either of these elements,12 then she is immune from damages liability.
Despite the widespread assumption that qualified immunity plays a
large role in the inability of many Bivens plaintiffs to prevail against federal
officials, there is little empirical support for the proposition. Some authors
have relied on data from reported decisions,13 but data from a wider range
of cases have not suggested that qualified immunity plays a substantial role
in the resolution of Bivens claims.14 Assuming for the moment that quali-
fied immunity does not play a significant role in the outcomes of most filed
cases, this paper attempts to explore ways in which qualified immunity may
still matter, particularly at the stage whereby putative plaintiffs convert their
grievances into formal legal requests for relief.
This article proceeds in the following manner. Part I introduces the
doctrine of qualified immunity as it relates to Bivens litigation. Part II sum-
marizes the consensus view that qualified immunity is a substantial barrier
to success in Bivens claims and offers some reason to question this view.
Part III considers other possible explanations for why qualified immunity
may matter in Bivens litigation, particularly at the pre-filing, informal
screening stage. It reports on a qualitative survey of experienced Bivens
attorneys that suggests qualified immunity has a significant impact on case
selection. These data suggest that the fear of facing a qualified immunity
9. See generally Laurence H. Tribe, Death by a Thousand Cuts: Constitutional Wrongs
Without Remedies After Wilkie v. Robbins, CATO SUP. CT. REV., 2006-2007, at 23 (arguing that
Bivens remedy has been gradually undermined, and is endangered by the Court’s analysis in Wil-
kie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588 (2007)); James E. Pfander & David Baltmanis, Rethinking Bivens:
Legitimacy and Constitutional Adjudication, 98 GEO. L.J. 117 (2009) (criticizing the Supreme
Court’s Bivens jurisprudence and suggesting alternative analysis).
10. See Reinert, supra note 5, at 812 (summarizing literature analyzing Bivens actions). R
11. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341–42 (1986).
12. Although qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, see Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S.
635, 640 (1980), not every circuit consistently allocates to the defendant the burdens of establish-
ing the defense. See discussion infra Part I.E.
13. See, e.g., Diana Hassel, Living a Lie: The Cost of Qualified Immunity, 64 MO. L. REV.
123, 136 n.65, 145 n.106 (1999) (finding that qualified immunity defenses were denied in only
twenty percent of federal cases over a two-year period, but citing only reported cases).
14. See Reinert, supra note 5, at 843–44. R
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defense may have more of an impact on the law than previously assumed.
Part IV offers a tentative conclusion and suggestions for further research.
I. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY SUMMARY
There are three basic sources of liability under federal law for govern-
ment officials or entities alleged to have violated substantive legal princi-
ples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a cause of action against state actors
for violations of the Constitution; liability pursuant to Bivens v. Six Un-
known Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,15 which implies a
cause of action for damages against federal officials for certain violations of
the Constitution;16 and statutory causes of action, which specifically pro-
vide causes of action against government officials or their entities, such as
the Americans with Disabilities Act. Whatever the source of liability, how-
ever, government officials and entities have three primary immunity de-
fenses available to them: qualified immunity, sovereign immunity, and
absolute immunity.17 Of these three, qualified immunity arises most fre-
quently for individual officials and will be the focus of this article.
A. Qualified Immunity Summary
Qualified immunity is a common-law concept, initially applied in the
Bivens context, that offers protection from personal liability to government
defendants who have not had “fair warning” that their conduct violated the
law.18 This formulation is a product of the tension between ensuring that
citizens have a means to remedy constitutional violations and the Supreme
Court’s judgment that “claims frequently run against the innocent as well as
the guilty—at a cost not only to the defendant officials, but to society as a
whole.”19
The Court in Harlow created the doctrine based on its acceptance of
the contention that “with increasing frequency . . . plaintiffs are filing suits
seeking damage awards against high government officials in their personal
capacities based on alleged constitutional torts,” which resist dismissal at
summary judgment because of the abilities of “ingenious plaintiff’s coun-
15. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
16. Although the Supreme Court has limited the reach of Bivens liability in many cases, it
has squarely held that prisoners may bring claims against federal officials for violations of the
Eighth Amendment. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 24–25 (1980).
17. Roger J. Perlstadt, Interlocutory Review of Litigation-Avoidance Claims: Insights from
Appeals Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 44 AKRON L. REV. 375, 376 (2011).
18. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see also Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S.
730, 739–40 (2002) (“The defendant [is] entitled to ‘fair warning’ that his conduct deprived his
victim of a constitutional right.”); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001) (“If the law did not
put the officer on notice that his conduct would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on
qualified immunity is appropriate.”); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 621 (1999) (discussing a
state judge who had fair warning when eliciting sexual favors from a potential litigant).
19. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814.
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sel” to create material issues of fact based on little evidence.20 Thus, mov-
ing to an “objective reasonableness” standard (from the prior good-faith
standard) was viewed as necessary to “permit the resolution of many insub-
stantial claims on summary judgment.”21
Qualified immunity is very frequently asserted as a defense to personal
capacity claims for damages, whether those claims are based in constitu-
tional or statutory protections.22 Under Harlow and its progeny, defendants
can establish the affirmative defense of qualified immunity through one of
two routes: (1) by showing that the defendant’s conduct did not violate law
that was clearly established at the time he or she acted; or (2) by showing
that they reasonably believed that their conduct did not violate clearly es-
tablished law.23 If a defendant can prevail on either prong, then she is enti-
tled to qualified immunity.24
In Saucier v. Katz, the Court adopted a mandatory two-step sequential
analysis to determine whether qualified immunity shields an official from
liability.25 First, defendants were required to show that, after drawing all
factual inferences in plaintiffs’ favor, plaintiffs have not alleged facts that
“show that the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right.”26 If defend-
ants could not meet this burden, then they were required to show that they
nonetheless were entitled to qualified immunity either because the defen-
dant did not violate clearly established law or because the defendant reason-
ably believed that her conduct did not violate clearly established law.27 The
mandatory nature of this sequential analysis was undermined in Pearson v.
Callahan,28 in which the Court held that while courts may analyze qualified
immunity by engaging in the Saucier “two-step” analysis described above,
they are not required to do so. They may skip the first question entirely and
instead begin by determining whether the defendant’s conduct violated
20. Id. at 817 n.29 (internal quotation marks omitted).
21. Id. at 818.
22. Most of the case law surrounding qualified immunity addresses the defense in the context
of constitutional claims, not statutory claims, but the logic of the qualified immunity defense—the
need to protect government officials from burdensome discovery and also encourage them to
make decisions without worrying overly about the prospect of being held personally liable in a
subsequent lawsuit—applies to any claim, whether based in the Constitution or statute.
23. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
24. At least superficially, qualified immunity is an affirmative defense. See, e.g., Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). The defendant always has some minimal burden to establish an
entitlement to the defense, but some circuits, as discussed in greater detail below, have adopted
variations of a burden-shifting scheme that places much of the burden of rebutting the defense on
the plaintiff.
25. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
26. Id. This is essentially the same inquiry that is required by any Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
motion.
27. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201 (2001).
28. 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
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clearly established law or the defendant reasonably believed she did not
violate clearly established law.29
The Court’s concern in Pearson was that the Saucier two-step analysis
posed the risk that courts would issue advisory opinions by unnecessarily
deciding whether the plaintiff’s allegations established a violation of the
law. On the other hand, skipping Saucier’s first step raises the concern that
constitutional law will become static because courts will focus on whether
particular rights were clearly established at the time of alleged violations,
rather than whether the rights exist at all. It remains to be seen how often
lower courts will accept the Court’s invitation to disregard the Saucier two-
step analysis—because the first step in Saucier is essentially identical to
deciding whether a plaintiff has stated a claim for relief, some courts may
continue to decide that question first before turning to the affirmative de-
fense of qualified immunity.30 Whether courts accept Pearson’s invitation
to answer the “clearly established law” question first, however, qualified
immunity will remain one of the principal defenses asserted by government
officials being sued for damages under Bivens.
B. Defendants Entitled to Assert Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity is available only in individual-capacity cases and
not in official-capacity cases.31 In other words, it is only available as a
defense to claims seeking damages, not to claims seeking injunctive relief.
Moreover, it is only available to individuals, whether sued as direct partici-
pants in a constitutional violation or on the basis of supervisory liability,32
but not to municipalities.33 Despite the fact that municipalities are not enti-
tled to the defense, some circuits, including the Second, hold that a right
must be clearly established before a municipality can be held liable for fail-
ure to train with respect to it.34
29. Id. at 236.
30. Indeed, the Supreme Court did just that in a recent Fourth Amendment case, deciding
first that school officials violated the Fourth Amendment, but also that the right was not clearly
established. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2645 (2009).
31. P.C. v. McLaughlin, 913 F.2d 1033, 1039 (2d Cir. 1990); see also Starkey ex rel. A.B. v.
Boulder Cnty. Soc. Services, 569 F.3d 1244, 1250 (10th Cir. 2009); Goodman v. Harris Cnty., 571
F.3d 388, 396 (5th Cir. 2009); Asociacion De Subscripcion Conjunta Del Seguro De Respon-
sabilidad Obligatorio v. Flores Galarza, 484 F.3d 1, 24 (1st Cir. 2007); Alexander v. City of
Milwaukee, 474 F.3d 437, 443 (7th Cir. 2007); Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 810–11 (6th Cir.
2003); Biggs v. Meadows, 66 F.3d 56, 61 (4th Cir. 1995); Melo v. Hafer, 912 F.2d 628, 635 (3d
Cir. 1990).
32. See Poe v. Leonard, 282 F.3d 123, 146–47 (2d Cir. 2002); see also Lowery v. Cnty. of
Riley, 522 F.3d 1086, 1092 (10th Cir. 2008); Valdes v. Crosby, 450 F.3d 1231, 1236 (11th Cir.
2006); Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 524 (5th Cir. 2004); Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d
693, 712–13 (6th Cir. 2001).
33. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 635–58 (1980).
34. See Young v. Cnty. of Fulton, 160 F.3d 899, 902–03 (2d Cir. 1998); Szabla v. City of
Brooklyn Park, 486 F.3d 385, 394 (8th Cir. 2007); Revis v. Meldrum, 489 F.3d 273, 288 (6th Cir.
2007); Kitzman-Kelley ex rel. Kitzman-Kelley v. Warner, 203 F.3d 454, 456–57 (7th Cir. 2000);
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The status of Bivens actions against private individuals is quite tenu-
ous, but in the § 1983 context, qualified immunity is not always available to
private individuals who are sued under § 1983.35 For instance, the Supreme
Court has explicitly held that privately employed prison guards are not enti-
tled to qualified immunity, at least in § 1983 litigation.36 Whether a private
individual is entitled to invoke the qualified immunity defense is deter-
mined on a case-by-case basis, after an analysis of history (whether private
individuals had a good faith defense at common law) and the purposes that
underlie governmental immunity—primarily, ensuring that individuals are
not deterred from serving the government.37
C. The Meaning of “Clearly Established” Law
As described above, a government official sued in his or her individual
capacity is entitled to qualified immunity: (1) if the defendant behaved rea-
sonably in light of clearly established law;38 or (2) if that conduct did not
violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a rea-
sonable person would have known.”39
The most important, and often determinative, question in the qualified
immunity inquiry is what law is “clearly established.” On one hand, it is
generally true that a Constitutional amendment cannot constitute “clearly
established” law without some judicial interpretation.40 Therefore, the
“clearly established” inquiry “must be undertaken in light of the specific
context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.”41 At the same time,
Joyce v. Town of Tewksbury, 112 F.3d 19, 23 (1st Cir. 1997). But see Gray v. City of Detroit, 399
F.3d 612, 616–17 (6th Cir. 2005) (“When an officer violates a plaintiff’s rights that are not
‘clearly established,’ but a city’s policy was the ‘moving force’ behind the constitutional violation,
the municipality may be liable even though the individual officer is immune.”). The rationale for
requiring that a right be clearly established in municipal failure-to-train cases is based on the fact
that the standard for municipal liability in such cases is “deliberate indifference.” Joyce, 112 F.3d
at 23 (“[O]ur rationale here for granting qualified immunity to the officers-that the unsettled state
of the law made it reasonable to believe the conduct in this case constitutional-also precludes
municipal liability. Tewksbury could not have been “deliberately indifferent” to citizens’ rights in
failing to teach the officers that their conduct was unconstitutional.”) (citations omitted); William-
son v. City of Virginia Beach, 786 F. Supp. 1238, 1264–65 (E.D. Va. 1992) (“[Even if] the
constitutional rights alleged by plaintiff did exist, the conclusion that they were not clearly estab-
lished negates the proposition that the city acted with deliberate indifference.”), aff’d, 991 F.2d
793 (4th Cir. 1993).
35. See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 159 (1992) (holding § 1983 private defendants sued for
invoking state replevin, garnishment, and attachment statutes later declared unconstitutional are
not entitled to qualified immunity).
36. Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 401 (1997).
37. See id. at 403–04.
38. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
39. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
40. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987). But see Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S.
551, 563–64 (2004) (finding that “particularity requirement” in Warrant Clause of Fourth Amend-
ment constituted clearly established law).
41. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.
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an earlier case may clearly establish a right, even when its facts are not
“materially similar” to the case in dispute.42 A court need only be con-
vinced that prior decisions gave “fair warning” that official conduct depriv-
ing someone of that right would be unconstitutional.43 In Hope v. Pelzer, a
§ 1983 case involving prison conditions, the Court found that prison
guards’ use of a “hitching post” as discipline violated clearly established
law despite the fact that there was sparse precedent—and on some accounts
no precedent—specifically striking down such punishment.44 In other
words, certain conduct will be so extreme that one would not expect a prior
decision on the issue: In some cases this absence of precedent may even
evince the impropriety of the practice.45
Absent extreme examples like the hitching post in Hope, however, a
recurring problem arises in defining the content of “clearly established law”
and how specific it must be to provide the “fair warning” qualified immu-
nity requires. Some courts have held that a right is clearly established if (1)
the law is defined with reasonable clarity; (2) the Supreme Court or the
controlling circuit court has recognized the right; and (3) a reasonable de-
fendant would have understood that his conduct was unlawful.46 Appellate
cases deciding whether a law was clearly established in specific factual con-
texts are far too numerous for this review. Some examples, however, offer
further guidance on how to analyze this question.
In one Second Circuit case, Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free
School District, a plaintiff alleged that she was the victim of stereotyping by
other women about the qualities of motherhood.47 The Second Circuit held
that certain defendants were not entitled to immunity because it was “emi-
nently clear by 2001, when the alleged discrimination took place, both that
individuals have a constitutional right to be free from sex discrimination,
and that adverse actions taken on the basis of gender stereotypes can consti-
tute sex discrimination.”48 Even though “there may not have been any
precedents with precisely analogous facts prior to the instant case,” given
the “well known underlying general legal principle,” defendants were not
42. E.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 740–41 (2002); Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640 (“This is
not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in
question has previously been held unlawful.”).
43. Hope, 536 U.S. at 741.
44. Id. (“Arguably, the violation was so obvious that our own Eighth Amendment cases gave
respondents fair warning that their conduct violated the Constitution.”).
45. E.g., Borello v. Allison, 446 F.3d 742, 750 (7th Cir. 2006) (“A plaintiff is required to
show that a violation of that right has been found in factually similar cases, or that the violation
was so clear that an official would realize he or she was violating an inmate’s constitutional rights
even in the absence of an on-point case.”).
46. See Anderson v. Recore, 317 F.3d 194, 197 (2d Cir. 2003); Young v. Cnty. of Fulton,
160 F.3d 899, 903 (2d Cir. 1998); Luna v. Pico, 356 F.3d 481, 490 (2d Cir. 2004).
47. 365 F.3d 107, 113 (2d Cir. 2004).
48. Id. at 130.
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entitled to qualified immunity.49 Similarly, in Andrews v. City of Philadel-
phia, the Third Circuit denied qualified immunity in a sexual harassment
case even though no Third Circuit precedent had held that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause specifically prohibited sexual harassment.50
Often the question of what law is “clearly established” is determined
by deciding the scope of the right the plaintiff asserts. A Second Circuit
prison case, LaBounty v. Coughlin,51 exemplifies this interrelationship. In
LaBounty, the plaintiff complained of chemical contamination in the
prison’s drinking water and exposure to friable asbestos in the air.52 In
holding that defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity, the court
stressed the importance of not defining the right at issue too narrowly (or
too broadly).53 The court found it too narrow to describe the right as “the
right to be free from crumbling asbestos.”54 Instead, the challenged conduct
was encompassed by “the right to be free from deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs,” a well-established Eighth Amendment right.55 Sim-
ilarly, in Ford v. McGinnis, the court denied qualified immunity to defend-
ants in a case involving a Muslim plaintiff’s right to participate in the
festival marking the end of Ramadan, absent specific precedent on the is-
sue.56 The court held that it was enough that the law was clearly established
as to a prisoner’s rights to a diet consistent with his religious beliefs and to
participate in religious services, even if confined in special housing.57
One issue in deciding whether law is clearly established is the extent to
which law can be considered clearly established when authority splits exist
within or without a particular circuit court of appeals. The circuits are di-
vided on this issue,58 as well as on whether district court decisions alone
49. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
50. See 895 F.2d 1469, 1479–80 (3d Cir. 1990).
51. 137 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 1998).
52. Id. at 73.
53. Id. at 73–74.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 74.
56. 352 F.3d 582, 584, 597 (2d Cir. 2003).
57. Id. at 597. Outside of the prison context, the Second Circuit has confirmed that officials
can have fair warning of the illegality of their conduct in “‘novel factual circumstances.’” Pena v.
DePrisco, 432 F.3d 98, 114–15 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002);
see also Greenwood v. N.Y. Office of Mental Health, 163 F.3d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1998) (reversing
district court’s decision on summary judgment which “relied heavily on the lack of any explicit
holding in our circuit” that clinical privileges at a hospital were a property interest).
58. The Third and Ninth Circuits take the position that a right can be clearly established
despite a split in authority among the circuits. See, e.g., Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041,
1046 (9th Cir. 2006); Bieregu v. Reno, 59 F.3d 1445, 1458–59 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding a right to
be clearly established despite a circuit split, as long as “no gaping divide has emerged in the
jurisprudence such that defendants could reasonably expect this circuit to rule” to the contrary),
abrogated on other grounds by Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996). The Fourth, Sixth, Seventh,
and Eighth Circuits take the position that disagreements between the circuits can render the law
unclear. See, e.g., Baranski v. Fifteen Unknown Agents, 452 F.3d 433, 449 (6th Cir. 2006) (en
banc); Mo. Prot. & Advocacy Servs. v. Mo. Dep’t of Mental Health, 447 F.3d 1021, 1025–26 (8th
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create clearly established rights.59
D. Objective Reasonableness Standard
Even where law prohibiting certain conduct is clearly established,
qualified immunity protects officials who “act in ways they reasonably be-
lieve to be lawful.”60 Hence, a defendant is not liable if he did not violate
clearly established law or if it was objectively reasonable for him to believe
that he was not violating clearly established law.61 The question becomes
“what a reasonable person in the defendant’s position should know about
the constitutionality of the conduct,” taking into account the facts known to
the defendant at the time of the conduct.62
E. Pleading and Proving Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity is considered an affirmative defense, which im-
plies that the defendant bears the burden of pleading and proving it. How-
ever, several circuits have adopted a more nuanced approach. At one
extreme are the Seventh and Tenth Circuits, which have stated that the
plaintiff has the burden of proof in qualified immunity cases.63 On the other
end are the First, Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits, which place the bur-
den of both pleading and proving an entitlement to qualified immunity on
the defendant.64
Cir. 2006) (holding where “no Supreme Court, Missouri, or Eighth Circuit case had yet decided
the issue,” it was not unreasonable for official to follow the New Hampshire Supreme Court rather
than the Third Circuit); Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 288 (4th Cir. 2001) (“[I]f there are no
cases of controlling authority in the jurisdiction in question, and if other appellate federal courts
have split on the question of whether an asserted right exists, the right cannot be clearly estab-
lished for qualified immunity purposes.”); Donovan v. City of Milwaukee, 17 F.3d 944, 953 (7th
Cir. 1994) (“Because only two circuits had considered cases on point, reaching opposite results,
we conclude that ‘the relevant case law was still developing [and] the key issue in this case had
not been clearly settled.’”) (citation omitted); see also Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 618 (1999)
(“If judges thus disagree on a constitutional question, it is unfair to subject police to money dam-
ages for picking the losing side of the controversy.”).
59. See Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 321 n.10 (3d Cir. 2001) (collecting cases from Second,
Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits).
60. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987).
61. Anderson v. Recore, 317 F.3d 194, 197 (2d Cir. 2003); Johnson v. Newburgh Enlarged
Sch. Dist., 239 F.3d 246, 250 (2d Cir. 2001).
62. McCullough v. Wyandanch Union Free Sch. Dist., 187 F.3d 272, 278 (2d Cir. 1999).
63. E.g., Mannoia v. Farrow, 476 F.3d 453, 457 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Although the privilege of
qualified immunity is a defense, the plaintiff carries the burden of defeating it.”); Reeves v.
Churchich, 484 F.3d 1244, 1250 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Once a defendant has raised qualified immu-
nity as an affirmative defense, the plaintiff bears the heavy two-part burden of demonstrating that
(1) the defendant violated a constitutional right and (2) the constitutional right was clearly estab-
lished at the time of the alleged conduct.”); see also Poolaw v. Marcantel, 565 F.3d 721, 728 (10th
Cir. 2009).
64. E.g., Blissett v. Coughlin, 66 F.3d 531, 539 (2d Cir. 1995); see, e.g., Henry v. Purnell,
501 F.3d 374, 377–78 (4th Cir. 2007); Moreno v. Baca, 431 F.3d 633, 637 (9th Cir. 2005);
DiMarco-Zappa v. Cabanillas, 238 F.3d 25, 35 (1st Cir. 2001).
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In between these extremes are the circuits that have adopted burden-
shifting frameworks. In the Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits, once the
defendant shows he was acting within his discretionary authority at the time
of the alleged unlawful conduct or that he acted in good faith, the burden of
proof “shifts . . . to the plaintiff to show that the defendant is not entitled to
qualified immunity.”65 In the Eighth Circuit, the defendant bears the burden
of proof on all elements of the defense, except the plaintiff must show that
the relevant law was clearly established.66
Qualified immunity can be raised at any time: at the motion to dismiss
stage, after limited or full discovery through summary judgment, or at
trial.67 A defendant need not raise it at any particular time to preserve it for
trial and may raise it as many times as she wishes.68
F. Appeal of Denial of Qualified Immunity
Defendants who seek dismissal on qualified immunity grounds are
protected from discovery until the threshold legal question of qualified im-
munity is resolved.69 Relatedly, defendants are entitled to take interlocutory
appeals of otherwise unappealable denials of motions to dismiss or sum-
mary judgment.70 This exception to the final judgment rule is justified as
one more tool for public officials to terminate insubstantial suits
promptly.71
Not every issue raised in the district court will be reviewable by an
appellate court, however. In general, qualified immunity raises the “essen-
tially legal question [of] whether the conduct of which the plaintiff com-
plains violated clearly established law.”72 However, if a district court’s
order is based on the sufficiency of the evidence, the decision is not imme-
diately appealable because that determination “is not truly ‘separable’ from
the plaintiff’s claim.”73 And when bringing a qualified immunity appeal,
65. Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 683 (6th Cir. 2008); see, e.g., Bates v. Harvey, 518
F.3d 1233, 1242 (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining that after defendant establishes that he was acting
pursuant to authority, plaintiff must show that qualified immunity is not appropriate because
“under the facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time, his actions violated clearly
established law”); Breen v. Texas A & M Univ., 485 F.3d 325, 331 (5th Cir. 2007) (“When a
defendant invokes qualified immunity . . . the burden shifts to the plaintiff to rebut the applicabil-
ity of the defense.”); see also Bazan v. Hidalgo County, 246 F.3d 481, 489 (5th Cir. 2001).
66. See Monroe v. Ark. State Univ., 495 F.3d 591, 594 (8th Cir. 2007).
67. See Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 306–07 (1996); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S.
511, 526 (1985).
68. This is the implication of Behrens, 516 U.S. 299, and Mitchell, 472 U.S. 511, which
permit interlocutory appeal of denials of qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss and sum-
mary judgment stage without regard for how many times a defendant has raised the defense.
69. See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991).
70. See Behrens, 516 U.S. at 307–09; Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526–27.
71. See Behrens, 516 U.S. at 306.
72. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526.
73. Behrens, 516 U.S. at 313. Behrens has been eroded slightly by the Court’s decision in
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007), in which the Court sub silentio exercised jurisdiction over a
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the defendant must accept the plaintiff’s version of the facts the district
court adopted so that the appellate court can review its determination of the
“purely legal issue [of] what law was ‘clearly established.’”74
In the motion to dismiss context, however, the Supreme Court has in-
dicated that it is appropriate for appellate courts to exercise appellate juris-
diction over the question of whether a complaint sufficiently alleges a
constitutional cause of action, even though this issue is distinct from
whether the law governing the claim was clearly established at the time of
the defendant’s conduct.75 As the Court explained, both issues are decided
on purely legal grounds that are well within an appellate court’s expertise,
unlike the sufficiency of the evidence determination made at the summary
judgment stage.76
II. ROLE OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY IN BIVENS CASES
Almost from its inception, Bivens has occupied a tenuous position as a
tool for vindicating civil rights. The Supreme Court initially indicated its
intent to apply Bivens liability beyond the Fourth Amendment context in
which it arose to other kinds of constitutional violations.77 Thus, the Su-
preme Court put plaintiffs injured by federal officials’ unconstitutional con-
duct in nearly the same shoes as victims of state and municipal
unconstitutional conduct (who have a statutory right to seek damages and
other remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).78 Precisely because Bivens was a
matter of judicial implication, however, the Court retains and has exercised
the power to limit the extent of any Bivens remedy, consistently restricting
its reach from 1980 on.79
Thus, despite its broad potential, most commentators view Bivens lia-
bility as more powerful in theory than in practice. This is due partly to the
Court’s continued hostility to “extending” Bivens to new constitutional con-
factual sufficiency determination because there was material in the record that “quite clearly con-
tradict[ed]” the lower courts’ interpretation of the factual material. Id. at 378.
74. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 (1995).
75. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1946–47 (2009).
76. Id. at 1947.
77. See Reinert, supra note 5, at 822. R
78. Section 1983 provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects . . . any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for re-
dress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). Although § 1983 plaintiffs can recover costs and attorneys’ fees if they
are successful, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, no similar provision is applicable to Bivens plaintiffs. See, e.g.,
Kreines v. United States, 33 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 1994) (rejecting claim for attorneys’ fees in
Bivens action and collecting cases coming to similar conclusion).
79. See, e.g., Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 562 (2007); United States v. Stanley, 483
U.S. 669, 684 (1987); see also Tribe, supra note 9, at 64–67.
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texts and partly to the barriers to success built into recognized Bivens
causes of action. Thus, both academics and judges assume that Bivens liti-
gation is generally unsuccessful as a practical matter.80 Commentators offer
many explanations for this relative lack of success, but most agree that Biv-
ens plaintiffs are disadvantaged because the personal defense of qualified
immunity is an imposing barrier to recovery from federal officers.81
Supporting this general view that qualified immunity plays a signifi-
cant role in the resolution of Bivens actions are empirical studies that have
suggested that, when introduced as a defense, it is highly successful.82
These studies, however, were based entirely on reported decisions, which at
the district court level may exclude over 95% of judicial decision-making.83
A study that I conducted of all district court decisions and dockets over a
three-year period within five varied judicial districts revealed that only 2%
of Bivens cases were resolved via qualified immunity defenses.84 While
80. Reinert, supra note 5, at 812. R
81. See, e.g., PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT 100–02 (1983) (arguing for expanded
governmental liability in lieu of individual liability, because immunity doctrine is unpredictable,
does not deter, and often leaves victims without compensation); George D. Brown, Accountability,
Liability, and the War on Terror—Constitutional Tort Suits as Truth and Reconciliation Vehicles,
63 FLA. L. REV. 193, 218–20 (2011) (describing role of immunity in national security cases);
Michael W. Dolan, Constitutional Torts and the Federal Tort Claims Act, 14 U. RICH. L. REV.
281, 297 (1980) (citing Department of Justice figures that only seven of “several thousand” Bivens
suits have resulted in judgments against federal defendants, with the likely culprit being the avail-
ability of qualified immunity); Richard H. Fallon, Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, 96 VA. L.
REV. 1043, 1111 (2010) (focusing on Supreme Court’s finding of qualified immunity in most
Bivens cases); Morgan Leigh Manning, Less than Picture Perfect: The Legal Relationship Be-
tween Photographers’ Rights and Law Enforcement, 78 TENN. L. REV. 105, 145 (2010) (stating
that qualified immunity is “fatal” in most Bivens cases); Peter Margulies, Judging Myopia in
Hindsight: Bivens Actions, National Security Decisions, and the Rule of Law, 96 IOWA L. REV.
195, 218–19 (2010) (noting that qualified immunity seeks to protect officials from “hindsight bias,
which transforms mistakes into products of ‘dishonest or vindictive motives’”); Perry M. Rosen,
The Bivens Constitutional Tort: An Unfulfilled Promise, 67 N.C. L. REV. 337, 356 (1989)
(describing qualified immunity as “most substantial obstacle to recovery by a constitutional tort
plaintiff”); H. Allen Black, Note, Balance, Band-Aid, or Tourniquet: The Illusion of Qualified
Immunity for Federal Officials, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 733, 774–75 (1991) (arguing that,
because of conceptual and practical difficulties with qualified immunity doctrine, Bivens actions
should be encompassed within FTCA claims).
82. See Greg Sobolski & Matt Steinberg, Note, An Empirical Analysis of Section 1983 Quali-
fied Immunity Actions and Implications of Pearson v. Callahan, 62 STAN. L. REV. 523, 525, 545
(2010) (reporting that qualified immunity was denied in about one-third of a random sample of
over nine hundred published § 1983 decisions issued by the federal appellate courts between 1976
and 2008); Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified Immunity Experiment: An Empirical Analysis, 36
PEPP. L. REV. 667, 692 (2009) (finding, in random sample of published qualified immunity opin-
ions decided by federal courts between 1988 and 2006, that immunity was denied in only about
20% to 30% of the cases); Hassel, supra note 13, at 136 n.65, 145 n.106 (finding that qualified
immunity defenses were denied in only 20% of federal cases over a two-year period, but citing
only reported cases). These studies did not compare the rate at which qualified immunity served as
a ground for dismissal with the rate at which other bases for dismissal were relied upon.
83. Hillel Y. Levin, Making the Law: Unpublication in the District Courts, 53 VILL. L. REV.
973, 976 (2008).
84. See Reinert, supra note 5, at 832, 843–44. R
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these data themselves are limited, they at least suggest the possibilty that it
is misleading to look only to published cases to determine the role that
qualified immunity plays in Bivens litigation.
So, let us assume that qualified immunity plays a much less significant
role in the outcomes of run-of-the-mill cases than has previously been as-
sumed. Nonetheless, the defense still could have a significant impact on
Bivens litigation for many reasons. First, because qualified immunity fo-
cuses on those cases in which the law is hazy, the defense is most logically
going to do its most significant work when a claim for relief is novel or
unanticipated by prior precedent. These cases may be a small subset of the
overall universe of Bivens claims, but they may also be more significant to
the public and the legal community precisely because of their precedential
and political significance. Indeed, this may explain the difference between
the reported role of qualified immunity in published and appellate decisions
and its reported role in a broader range of decisions.
Second, qualified immunity may be important as a release valve be-
cause it may provide courts with an opportunity to affirm that a particular
plaintiff was wronged, even if it is unfair to hold an individual defendant
personally liable for that wrong. John Jeffries has made arguments along
this line, essentially maintaining that the rights-remedy gap qualified immu-
nity creates is a net positive because it frees courts to announce new rights
going forward without imposing retroactive liability on government
officials.85
It is worth noting that for qualified immunity to play a role in either of
these scenarios, cases in which a qualified immunity defense may be raised
must be filed with the courts. Courts cannot take advantage of qualified
immunity as a pressure valve if every filed case involves legal principles so
commonly accepted that there is never a need or opportunity to announce
new legal principles. In this sense, at least where the law is unclear, there
likely is an optimal amount of cases involving novel legal principles in
which qualified immunity may be an appropriate defense. If very few or no
cases are filed in which qualified immunity may play a dispositive role, that
may limit the power of federal courts to announce prospective rules moving
forward, even if underlying constitutional violations have transpired.
This brings me to the question I seek to begin to answer here: namely,
whether qualified immunity is affecting case-screening decisions for those
attorneys who have some experience litigating Bivens actions. To assess
this possibility, I report on the results of a series of conversations with attor-
neys with experience litigating Bivens and other civil rights claims. These
results, while limited in some respects, reflect a hesitance of many attorneys
85. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., Disaggregating Constitutional Torts, 110 YALE L.J. 259, 287
(2000); John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 90
(1999).
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to litigate cases that could even come close to implicating the qualified
immunity defense.
III. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AS A PRE-LITIGATION FILTER
Evaluating the role that qualified immunity may play at the pre-litiga-
tion stage of a case is not subject to easy quantification. It is perhaps impos-
sible to know how many Bivens cases have never been filed because of the
threat of a qualified immunity defense. But it is likely that attorneys who
have experience with Bivens and other civil rights litigation will have a
valuable, if anecdotal, perspective to offer on the role, if any, that qualified
immunity plays in case screening. This part of the paper describes my at-
tempt to capture that perspective, and provides some initial, necessarily ten-
uous, impressions.
I summarize the results below, but I must emphasize that it is far too
soon to draw any conclusions from them. First, at this point it is impossible
to know if the respondents are representative of Bivens litigators (to the
extent there is such an identifiable group) or civil rights litigators more
generally. Second, the collection of data was not systematic; I did not use a
directed interview approach and generally was content to let the respon-
dents dictate the course of the conversation. I also do not have training that
might be appropriate for conducting uniform qualitative research of this
kind. Thus, for each conversation, I surely asked the same questions in dif-
ferent ways depending on the course of the discussion. Third, the “data,”
even had they been collected by someone with greater experience and train-
ing, are soft by nature. I have questioned reliance on anecdotal reports
about the state of Bivens litigation in the past,86 and I am loath to place
undue weight on it in this context.
Nonetheless, the data at least point in useful directions for further re-
search and, although soft, may be the only way of unearthing the effect of
qualified immunity at the case-screening stage. Unlike measuring “success”
of litigation, which at least can be defined one way or another and then
evaluated, considerations of case screening are very difficult to measure
quantitatively. For example, the cases rejected by attorneys may ultimately
be filed pro se, but discovering this fact may be impossible given attorney-
client confidentiality.87 Finally, however reliable the data may be for draw-
ing broad conclusions, they are fundamentally interesting and reinforce
some of the observations about Bivens litigation that other commentators
and I have made in the past.
86. Reinert, supra note 5, at 827–31. R
87. Consultations for the purpose of case evaluation are considered confidential. Therefore,
even if attorneys could remember or provide records for each of the cases that they rejected
because of qualified immunity or other concerns, they could not disclose that information to allow
for follow-up to determine whether rejected cases ultimately found a home with another attorney
or were filed pro se.
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The first task was to identify attorneys who have had some experience
litigating Bivens claims. This was accomplished by first searching for all
reported decisions after January 1, 2006, in which the plaintiff was repre-
sented by counsel and the Bivens decision was cited.88 This search pro-
duced 299 decisions, but not all were Bivens cases. Therefore, I reviewed
each decision and identified 133 cases in which one or more attorneys had
brought a Bivens or related cause of action.89 To focus on the attorneys
most likely to have experience with multiple Bivens actions, I then con-
ducted a secondary search for each attorney in each of the 133 cases to
determine which of them had been involved in multiple reported decisions
in which Bivens or a related cause of action was implicated, identifying
more than forty attorneys or law firms.90 After identifying these attorneys, I
sought to contact each by telephone (or, alternatively, by email) to discuss
the potential role that qualified immunity concerns played in their decisions
to accept Bivens cases for representation. Telephone conversations with
these attorneys were generally unstructured, but I sought to focus respon-
dents on the following issues: (1) screening factors in general, including
firm resources, client considerations, and substantive law; (2) the extent to
which evaluations of qualified immunity as a substantive barrier to relief
were considered at the case-screening stage; (3) the extent to which the
procedural dimensions of qualified immunity (e.g., the availability of inter-
locutory appeal or the likelihood of stays of discovery during resolution of
the qualified immunity defense) affected screening decisions; and (4) any
observations the respondents could make about the distinction between Biv-
ens cases and § 1983 cases that mattered for screening. Respondents were
informed that I was working on a paper regarding Bivens litigation and the
role of qualified immunity and that their responses to my questions would
be incorporated into the paper.
Nearly every respondent, regardless of the breadth of her experience,
confirmed that concerns about the qualified immunity defense play a sub-
stantial role at the screening stage.91 For some, qualified immunity was the
primary factor when evaluating a case for representation. Most of these re-
spondents focused on the hostility to Bivens and other civil rights actions
within their own circuits when explaining why qualified immunity was so
significant a case-evaluation tool. For instance, one advocate operating in
88. I used the following search in the “CTA” Westlaw database: BIVENS & da(aft 1/1/2006)
% (“PRO SE”).
89. For instance, some cases involved Federal Tort Claims Act claims. I reasoned that attor-
neys who initiated FTCA actions were likely to have been involved with Bivens actions on other
occasions.
90. This was accomplished using the following search in the “ALLFEDS” Westlaw database:
“Bivens & at (**)” where “**” was the name of each attorney.
91. Telephone and email interviews with Respondent No. 1 (Mar. 10, 2011); No. 4 (Mar. 9,
2011); No. 8 (Mar. 8, 2011); No. 13 (Mar. 9, 2011); No. 14 (Mar. 8, 2011); No. 18 (Mar. 8, 2011);
No. 19 (Mar. 10, 2011); No. 26 (Mar. 9, 2011); No. 29 (Mar. 9, 2011) (notes on file with author).
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the Fourth Circuit explained that that court’s approach forced him to take
qualified immunity concerns into account at the outset of client screening.92
Similarly, a lawyer working in Illinois stated that because of the Seventh
Circuit’s case law, he will not take a case if there is even the “slightest
chance” that dismissal will be based on qualified immunity.93
For those respondents who felt that qualified immunity was less signif-
icant, the explanation often addressed other case-selection criteria. For in-
stance, multiple respondents indicated that they only accepted the most
egregious cases for representation, which made it unlikely that qualified
immunity would play a role.94 While acceptance of egregious cases was not
designed to avoid qualified immunity concerns, it had this incidental effect
because it is unlikely that a defendant who committed an egregious viola-
tion would also be protected by qualified immunity. For a few other respon-
dents, qualified immunity did not play a role either because of self-
professed hubris95 or a unique mission. Respondents who worked at non-
profit organizations or who had other law reform goals, for instance, ex-
pressed concern about qualified immunity but stated that it was not disposi-
tive because of their organization’s mission.96
Only one respondent, with a small amount of experience litigating Biv-
ens actions, minimized the role of qualified immunity.97 Instead, this re-
spondent’s concerns about Bivens litigation had more to do with the
“special factors” analysis than qualified immunity. Thus, my study suggests
nearly overwhelming support for the proposition that qualified immunity
considerations matter at the screening stage, and some attorneys consider
them dispositive. On the substantive side, some respondents accounted for
qualified immunity by not taking cases in which it could be raised, taking
only the most egregious cases, or attempting to limit the impact of circuit
precedent by litigating cases in state court (something that is a non-starter
for Bivens claims).98
Qualified immunity also mattered to these attorneys on the procedural
side. That is, the aspect of qualified immunity that permits interlocutory
appeal at every stage of the proceeding, with stays of discovery routinely
granted pending the resolution of a qualified immunity defense, also oper-
ates as a substantial factor in case screening. Two respondents indepen-
92. Interview with Respondent No. 8.
93. Interview with Respondent No. 18.
94. Interviews with Respondents Nos. 1, 3, 7, 17.
95. One respondent stated that qualified immunity did not matter to him because “I like
challenges.” Interview with Respondent No. 10.
96. Interviews with Respondents Nos. 19, 31.
97. Interview with Respondent No. 44.
98. Although state courts of general jurisdiction could presumably exercise subject matter
jurisdiction over Bivens claims, defendants could also exercise the right to remove to federal
court. Every respondent who addressed the question took the view that federal civil defendants
would always prefer to be in federal court.
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dently referred to the interlocutory appeal issue as a “killer,” because it
slows down the litigation.99 While an appeal is being resolved, evidence
may become stale, witnesses may disappear, and a client may lose hope.100
For defendants in a case with political implications, the delays occasioned
by the procedural aspect of qualified immunity may stretch litigation on so
that it becomes the problem of a new administration.101
Finally, the attorneys offered some explanations regarding the relative
scarcity of Bivens litigation and its perceived lack of success. Some respon-
dents noted that one explanation for the difficulty bringing Bivens suits re-
lates to the tendency of federal judges to defer to federal agents, particularly
law enforcement agents.102 Others pointed to the related observation that
federal agents are, as a matter of both perception and reality, more sophisti-
cated, professional, and well-trained than their state counterparts.103 Finally,
some respondents indicated that the inability to obtain attorneys’ fees for
Bivens actions, as well as the formal position that the federal government
takes regarding indemnification of individual employees, deters lawyers
from bringing such claims.104
IV. REFLECTIONS ON THE DATA
The data are limited and anecdotal in nature, but assuming these re-
sults are representative of the available pool of lawyers who represent po-
tential Bivens plaintiffs, they suggest a number of conclusions. First,
qualified immunity plays a large role in case selection. Most attorneys seem
to select cases to avoid any possible qualified immunity issues arising in the
litigation. If the given wisdom that plaintiffs’ lawyers are risk averse is
true,105 the limited universe of attorneys who litigate Bivens-type claims
may choose cases in which qualified immunity plays a limited role in case
resolution. The result may be that the vast majority of Bivens cases never
test the limits of existing law, because the attorneys who file them select
cases that are within the “clearly established” zone that will defeat a quali-
fied immunity defense.
Second, qualified immunity may have this impact not simply because
of its substantive content, but also due to the procedural obstacles that ac-
99. Interviews with Respondents Nos. 7, 29.
100. Interviews with Respondents Nos. 7, 26, 29.
101. Interview with Respondent No. 13.
102. Interviews with Respondents Nos. 10, 19.
103. Interviews with Respondents Nos. 7, 8.
104. Interviews with Respondents Nos. 7, 13.
105. See, e.g., Robert H. Lande, New Options for State Indirect Purchaser Legislation: Pro-
tecting the Real Victims of Antitrust Violations, 61 ALA. L. REV. 447, 453 (2010); Patrick A. Luff,
Bad Bargains: The Mistake of Allowing Cost-Benefit Analyses in Class Action Certification Deci-
sions, 41 U. MEM. L. REV. 65, 80 n.59 (2010); John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney
General: Why the Model of the Lawyer As Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215,
230–32 (1983).
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company invocation of the qualified immunity defense. Dealing with client
expectations while a case is on interlocutory appeal and not progressing
through discovery may be a deterrent to bringing particular lawsuits—even
when the plaintiff’s attorney thinks that the qualified immunity defense will
ultimately be rejected.
The effect of qualified immunity, therefore, may not be to reduce the
success of civil rights claims but to limit the extent to which civil rights
litigation tests the boundaries of the law. If the result is a suboptimal level
of constitutional Bivens litigation, then it might be worth considering some
modifications short of the governmental liability model that many critics of
qualified immunity have suggested.106 For instance, if attorneys’ fees were
available for plaintiffs who showed that their rights were violated, even
though the rights were not clearly established, it might incentivize attorneys
to represent litigants in the “gray” area of constitutional litigation. This
model is not foreign to civil rights litigation—in mixed-motive employment
discrimination cases, plaintiffs are not entitled to compensatory damages
but may be awarded other relief, including attorneys’ fees.107 Similarly, cir-
cuit courts of appeals could create fast-track appeals for cases involving
appeals from the denial of qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss
stage, so as to minimize the delay for discovery. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit recently created a fast track for appeals of a
large category of motions to dismiss.108 Notably, however, appeals from
denials of motions to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds are not in-
cluded in the new procedure.
I recognize that we may worry less about suboptimal levels of civil
rights litigation for damages if we think that there are not that many viola-
tions of the law in the gray area that qualified immunity protects. As to the
former possibility, it is not clear that there are other effective ways of en-
forcing most constitutional rights outside of damages litigation. Injunctive
relief is not a viable option for many reasons, particularly in the area of the
Fourth Amendment, and criminal cases rarely result in written opinions
resolving disputed constitutional issues. When they do, they often revolve
around fact-intensive applications of established constitutional law. With
regard to the possibility that there simply are not that many violations of the
law in the gray area implicated by qualified immunity, it is difficult if not
impossible to evaluate this contention.
106. See Reinert, supra note 5, at 814 n.18 (summarizing literature). R
107. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2006).
108. See 2D CIR. R. 31.2(b) (effective Dec. 15, 2010) (creating fast track for appeals from
dismissals based on Rules 12(b)(1), (6) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)).
